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The Riegle-Neal Amendments Act of 1997: The Impact of
Interstate Branching on the Dual Banking System
I. INTRODUCTION
The way Americans bank has changed dramatically since the
early 1920s when "bdnking needs and practices were relatively
localized and unsophisticated."' Today, Americans are more mobile
and need banking services when they cross state lines. 2 As a result,
banks have used technology to make customers' money mobile as
well. Internet banking and Automated Teller Machines (ATMs), for
example, give customers the ability to access and obtain funds from
their bank accounts from anywhere in the country.3
Responding to the changing banking market, Congress
modernized the banking laws by passing the Riegle-Neal Interstate
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (Riegle-Neal).4 In
short, Riegle-Neal allows bank holding companies (BHCs)5 to
acquire banks in any state6 and permits banks to engage in interstate
branching if both the "home state" and the "host state" have opted in
to Riegle-Neal.7 States had until June 1, 1997, to either opt in or opt
out of Riegle-Neal's interstate branching provision As this deadline
approached, uncertainty existed over whether home or host state law
would apply to state bank interstate branches.9 On July 3, 1997,
1. Mark D. Rollinger, Interstate Banking and Branching Under the Riegle-NealAct of
1994, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 183, 210 (1996).
2. See id.
3. See id.
4. Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
For a complete analysis of Riegle-Neal, see Rollinger, supra note 1.
5. A BHC is characterized as "any company which has control over any bank." 12
U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) (1994).
6. See id. § 1842(d)(1)(A).
7. See id. § 1831u. The "home state" is, for state banks, the "[sitate by which the
bank is chartered," or for national banks, "[the] state in which the main office of the bank is
located." Id. § 183 lu(f)(4). A "host state" is any "[s]tate, other than the home [s]tate of the
bank, in which the bank maintains, or seeks to establish and maintain, a branch." Id. §
183lu(fJ(5).
8. See id. § 183 1(u)(a)(2)(A); see also infra notes 38-58 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 86, 97-101 and accompanying text. A "branch" is defined as "any
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President Clinton signed the Riegle-Neal Amendments Act of 1997
(Amendments Act)1" which gives host state law control over state
bank interstate branches" to the same extent host state law controls
national bank interstate branches. 2 Additionally, the Amendments
Act allows state bank interstate branches to engage in activities
allowed under their home state charter to the extent that those
activities are permitted either for national bank interstate branches or
for state-chartered banks in the host state. 3
This Comment explores recent developments in interstate
branching, including how the Amendments Act attempts to
accomplish conflicting congressional goals relating to the dual
banking system. Part II discusses the history of interstate
branching, 4  the structure Riegle-Neal creates for interstate
branching, 5 states' decisions to opt in or opt out of interstate
branching under Riegle-Neal,16 and provisions of Riegle-Neal that
permit states to protect their banks and economies. 7  Part III
analyzes why Congress enacted the Amendments Act 8 and explains
the provisions of the Amendments Act.' 9 Part IV scrutinizes whether
branch bank, branch office, branch agency, additional office, or any branch place of
business ... at which deposits are received, or checks paid, or money lent." 12 U.S.C. §
36(j). Under the Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996,
ATMs and automated loan machines are no longer regarded as branches, even if established
and operated by the bank. Compare 12 U.S.C.A. § 360) (West Supp. 1997), with
Independent Bankers Ass'n of America v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921, 951 (D.C. Cir. 1976)
(holding, prior to the Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996,
that an ATM is a branch if established and operated by a bank). As a result of the
Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996, national banks can
now establish ATMs in states that prohibit interstate branching.
10. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 1831a(j), 36(f)(1)(C) (West Supp. 4 1997).
11. A "state bank interstate branch" or "national bank interstate branch" is a branch of
"a bank whose home [s]tate is another [s]tate." 12 U.S.C. § 1831u(f)(8). Although the
statute uses the terms "out-of-[s]tate [s]tate bank" and "out-of-[s]tate national bank" to refer
to interstate branches, the terms "state bank interstate branch" and "national bank interstate
branch" will be used to refer to interstate branches throughout this Comment.
12. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 183la(j)(1) (West Supp. 4 1997); see also infra notes 124-26,
160-77 and accompanying text.
13. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 183 1a(j)(2); see also infra notes 123, 129-59 and accompanying
text.
14. See infra notes 22-29 and accompanying text.
15. See infra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 38-70 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 71-85 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 86-115 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 116-26 and accompanying text.
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the Amendments Act accomplishes the goals Congress intended."
Finally, this Comment concludes that the Amendments Act succeeds
in creating competitive equality between state and national banks in
interstate branching, but sacrifices other competing goals to do so."'
II. BACKGROUND
A. The McFadden Act
Before the passage of Riegle-Neal, the McFadden Act of
19272 governed interstate branching practices. Under the McFadden
Act, national banks could branch within a state only to the extent that
a state bank could do so.2Y Therefore, the McFadden Act delegated
to states the power to decide how national banks could branch within
their borders.24 In order to limit intrastate competition between
banks, states generally prohibited interstate branching.25 Therefore, a
BHC wishing to operate in multiple states had to establish separately
chartered banks in each of those states. 26  For customers, these
barriers to interstate branching made receiving banking services
difficult or impossible once customers left their home state, even at
banks controlled by the same BHC as their home state bank.27 For
20. See infra notes 127-88 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
22. 12 U.S.C. § 36 (1989), repealed by Pub. L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994).
23. See id. § 36(c). This federal restriction on geographic bank expansion was intended
to guard against overconcentration of power within the banking industry. See Clyde
Mitchell, The Arrival of Interstate Branching, N.Y. L.J., July 16, 1997, at 3.
24. See Edward Herlihy et al., Financial institutions-Mergers and Acquisitions 1996:
Another Successful Round of Consolidation and Capital Management, in FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS MERGERS AND ACQUISmONS: TIE NEW ERA, at 251, 436 (PLI Corp. Law &
Practice Course Handbook Series No. B-973, 1997).
25. See Heidi Mandanis Schooner, Recent Challenges to the Persistent Dual Banking
System, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 263, 269 (1996).
26. See Rollinger, supra note 1, at 186. National banks, under the National Bank Act's
thirty-mile rule, circumvented state prohibitions on interstate branching by relocating their
headquarters across state lines while retaining the branches in the former state. See 12
U.S.C. §§ 30(b), 36 (West Supp. 1997); see, e.g., Ghiglieri v. Sun World, N.A., 117 F.3d
309 (5th Cir. 1997),petition for cert.filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3493 (U.S. Dec. 23, 1997) (No. 97-
1078). As a result, a single bank with branches in two states was formed. See Sun World,
117 F.3d at 311; see also infra notes 55, 64 and accompanying text.
27. Interstate branching under Riegle-Neal will provide greater convenience to bank
customers. See Rollinger, supra note 1, at 218-21. In particular, interstate branching will
benefit the sixty million Americans who commute across state lines on a day-to-day basis
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businesses, the restrictiveness of the McFadden Act adversely
affected profitability.2 Responding to these effects, in the early
1990s some states began to allow interstate branching, usually on a
reciprocal basis. 9
B. The Riegle-Neal Act
Recognizing that the McFadden Act impeded the progression
toward nationwide banking, Congress passed Riegle-Neal, which
authorizes interstate branching by both national and state banks.30 As
of June 1, 1997, a BHC need only have one bank subsidiary to
operate in states that have opted in to Riegle-Neal's interstate
branching provision.31 Under Riegle-Neal, banking entities may
because they live in "multi-state metropolitan area[s] such as Washington D.C.,
Philadelphia, St. Louis... New York City," Charlotte, Cincinnati, and Chicago. Id. at 220.
Likewise, business travelers and tourists will experience more convenience in obtaining
banking services and executing banking transactions. Id. People relocating will also
benefit under Riegle-Neal because they may no longer have to worry about opening or
closing their bank accounts. See id. Interstate branching may also mean lower costs to
bank customers because banks will reduce operating expenses and increase efficiency. See
id. at 218. But cf Rick Stouffer, Mergers Will Increase with New Banking Law on Books,
BuFFALo NEWS, June 3, 1997, at D1, available in 1997 WL 6439951 (arguing that Riegle-
Neal will lead to greater consolidation of banks, which generally leads to higher bank fees).
28. Large companies that engage in interstate commerce or that operate in multiple
states usually have several different deposit accounts with various banks for which they pay
"monitoring costs, transfer fees, and other expenses." Rollinger, supra note 1, at 219.
Riegle-Neal enables companies to cut these costs. As borrowers, businesses will also
benefit under Riegle-Neal as banks grow because the larger the bank, the more it can loan to
a single borrower, resulting in lower loan transaction costs. See id. Riegle-Neal also
enables banks to cut costs because it is cheaper to operate one bank with multiple branches
than to maintain separately chartered banks in different states. See Julie Carrick Dalton,
Interstate Banking Law Means Consolidation of Subsidiaries, BOSTON Bus. J., June 20,
1997, available in 1997 WL 8885168.
29. See Edward D. Herlihy et al., Bank Mergers and Acquisitions 1993: A Year of
Increasing Franchise Consolidation, in BANKING DEVELOPMENTS UNDER THE CLINTON
ADMINISTRATION, at 145, 297 (PLI Comm. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A-
685, 1993). Before Riegle-Neal, the only states that allowed interstate branches were
Alaska, Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, and Rhode Island. See John A.
Buchman, Can Community Banks Survive: What the Interstate Banking Act Will Mean,
Bus. L. TODAY, Jan.-Feb. 1996, at 44, 46.
30. Riegle-Neal automatically authorizes national banks to engage in interstate merger
transactions, subject to antitrust and other considerations, with banks in states that did not
expressly opt out of Riegle-Neal's interstate branching provisions. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 36(g),
183 lu(a). States that did not expressly opt out had to adopt legislation allowing their state
banks to branch interstate. See Multistate Pacts Seek To Help State Banks On Interstate
Branching, BANKING POL'Y REP., Jan. 1, 1996, available in LEXIS, BANKNG Library,
BNKPOL File.
31. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831u(a).
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participate in interstate branching by: (1) consolidating banks with
or without a common BHC;32 (2) acquiring an existing bank or
branch in the state they wish to enter;33 or (3) opening a "de novo
branch."'34 Before an interstate merger or acquisition is approved, the
appropriate federal regulator must evaluate the bank's history of
compliance with the Community Reinvestment Act of 19773' and
any relevant state community reinvestment laws,36 as well as conduct
a written evaluation of the bank.37
32. See id.
33. See id. Riegle-Neal allows states to determine whether an out-of-state bank must
acquire only one branch or an entire bank in order to branch into the state. See id §
183 lu(a)(4); see also infra note 74 and accompanying text. States may also regulate branch
acquisitions through state aging laws. See 12 U.S.C. § 183 1u(a)(5); see also infra notes 45,
71 and accompanying text.
34. "De novo branching" occurs when a bank opens a new branch in a state where the
bank does not have any existing branches. Upon receiving approval from the Office of the
Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), a national bank may establish a de novo branch if the
host state expressly permits de novo branching among all out-of-state state and national
banks. See 12 U.S.C. § 36(g); infra notes 45, 72, 74 and accompanying text. State and
foreign banks face analogous requirements. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 1828(d)(4) (requiring FDIC
approval for state banks), 3103(a) (requiring Federal Reserve Board (FRB) and state
regulatory approval for foreign banks).
35. See 12 U.S.C. § 183 1u(a)(b)(3)(A). The Community Reinvestment Act is codified
at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907. The federal regulatory agencies have adopted regulations
dealing with Community Reinvestment Act requirements. See 12 C.F.R. § 25.21(b) (1997)
(OCC); id. § 228.21(b) (FRB); id. § 345.21(b) (FDIC). This evaluation does not occur if
the bank, prior to the merger, already has a branch or bank affiliate in the host state. See 12
U.S.C. § 1831u(b)(3). For a discussion of the Community Reinvestment Act, see Laura
Turner Beyer, Comment The Community Reinvestment Act: A Boost to Low-and
Moderate-Income Communities, a Set-Back for Minority-Owned Banks, I N.C. BANKING
INsT. 387 (1997), and Joseph Moore, Comment, Community Reinvestment Act and Its
Impact on Bank Mergers, I N.C. BANKING INST. 412 (1997).
36. See 12 U.S.C. § 183lu(b)(3)(C). In addition to community reinvestment
requirements, Riegle-Neal also mandates that banks terminating branches in low- to
moderate-income communities must give notice to their customers, allow them to comment,
and discuss possible alternatives with the area's leaders. See id. § 1831 r-l(d). As a result
of giving people a forum, the bank will face pressure to keep the branch open and receive
adverse press coverage, which could damage the bank's other branches in the area. See
Michael K. O'Neal, Impact of Recent and Proposed Federal Regulatory Developments and
Chartering Legislation, 51 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 27, 30 (1997). This procedural
requirement can be avoided by terminating the branch before finalizing an interstate merger
transaction. See id.
37. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 2906(b), (d). The regulator must evaluate overall bank
performance, write a separate report on performance in each state where the bank has one or
more branches, and conduct another written evaluation if the banking entity has one or




1. States Opting In to Riegle-Neal
As under the McFadden Act, states still have the choice of
whether to allow interstate branching.38  Congress, arguably
respecting the interest states have in controlling financial practices
within their borders and the traditional role of states in regulating the
banking industry,39 delegated the power to states to determine
whether to allow interstate branching within their borders by
permitting them to opt out of Riegle-Neal's interstate branching
provision." Forty-eight states, as well as the District of Columbia
and Puerto Rico, either opted in before June 1, 1997 or opted in by
default.4'
38. See id § 183 1u(a)(2). Prior to Riegle-Neal, in situations governed by the National
Bank Act's thirty-mile rule, principles of preemption dictated that states could not prevent
national banks from engaging in interstate branching by moving their main office across
state lines, while retaining their former headquarters as a branch. See 12 U.S.C. §§ 30(b),
36; supra note 26; see also Rollinger, supra note 1, at 191-92. National banks can no
longer use the thirty-mile rule to establish interstate branches unless the retained branches
could be reestablished under state law. See 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 30(c), 36(e)(2) (West Supp.
1997); infra note 55 and accompanying text.
39. States retain state taxation and antitrust regulation powers under Riegle-Neal. See
12 U.S.C. § 1831u(c)(1) (taxing power); id. § 1831u(c)(2) (power over state antitrust
regulation). The manner in which states can tax the interstate operations of banks is left
entirely to the states. See id. § 183lu(c)(1)(A)-(B). States can use their ability to tax to
create a friendly or hostile environment for banks. If a state taxes banks solely on the basis
of their state charter, or for national banks, the location of their main office, and did not
revise its tax laws when it opted in to Riegle-Neal, state tax revenue may be affected by the
consolidation of affiliated banks in multiple states. See Matthew D. Alman, Note, Interstate
Banking and Branching, 16 ANN. REv. BANKiNG L. 27, 31 (1996). When a BHC
consolidates its subsidiary banks, it can have branches in a host state and pay no tax if the
host state still taxes on the basis of having a state charter, or, for national banks, the location
of the bank's main office. See infra notes 63-70 and accompanying text (discussing
NationsBank's attempt to convert its Texas operations into interstate branches). Currently,
a majority of states are striving to change their tax codes so that they can tax their state-
chartered banks, national banks headquartered within the state, and interstate branches
equally. See Alman, supra, at 31; John L. Douglas & John A. Buchman, As States Adopt
Interstate Banking Even Before Federal Law Goes Into Effect, Holding Companies Mull
Consolidating Subsidiaries, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 29, 1996, at B4; see also Rollinger, supra note
1, at 243-44 (identifying a change in state tax laws as a solution to a reduction in state tax
revenue); infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text (explaining how Texas amended its
franchise tax laws).
40. See 12 U.S.C. § 183 1u(a)(2).
41. In order to opt in early, a state had to adopt legislation that "(i) applies equally to
all out-of-Is]tate banks; and (ii) expressly permits interstate merger transactions with all
out-of-[s]tate banks." Id. § 1831u(a)(3)(A). By expressly opting in to Riegle-Neal, a state
could have authorized interstate merger transactions as early as September 29, 1994. See id.
California, Connecticut, Delaware, Idaho, Maryland, Michigan, Nevada, North Carolina,
Oregon, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico, Rhode Island, Utah, and Virginia were among the first
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The fact that forty-eight states have opted in to Riegle-Neal
suggests that states have acknowledged that the banking industry has
changed and that states must adapt to these changes if they want to
protect and empower their own banks. North Carolina, for example,
which has authorized intrastate branching since it first began
regulating the business of banking in 192142 and permitted interstate
banking through the Southeast Compact,43 was one of the first states
to allow interstate branching 4 and then opted in early to Riegle-
Neal.4 ' As a result, North Carolina has developed a strong banking
community, which includes Charlotte, the second largest money-
center in the United States. 46  Because their state has embraced
geographic bank expansion and adopted liberal banking laws, North
states to opt in to interstate branching under Riegle-Neal. See All But Few States Beat
Trigger Date On Nationwide Branching, BANKING POL'Y REP., June 2, 1997, available in
LEXIS, BANKNG Library, BNKPOL file. If a state took no action, it automatically opted
in on June 1, 1997. See id. Missouri opted in by default. By not adopting legislation
empowering its state-chartered banks to branch interstate, a state places them at a
disadvantage because they may not engage in interstate branching, but out-of-state banks
may branch into the state. See id.; see also Special Order 1997-2, Kansas State Bank
Commissioner (May 30, 1997) (on file with Office of the Kansas State Bank
Commissioner) (establishing a framework for Kansas state banks to engage in interstate
branching because the Kansas Legislature failed to do so).
42. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-62 (Supp. 1997); 1921 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 4, § 43.
43. In the 1980s, some states granted BHCs from reciprocating states within certain
regions the ability to engage in interstate banking within their borders. See William D.
Gaither, Financial Institutions: Provide for Nationwide Reciprocal Banking, 11 GA. ST. U.
L. REv. 50, 50-51 (1994). In Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed.
Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159 (1985), the Supreme Court approved this practice of regional
interstate banking. Along with North Carolina, Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia,
Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, South Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and the District of
Columbia participated in the Southeast Compact. See Senate Panel Oks Interstate Banking;
Bill May Speed Dismantling of State Laws, ATLANTA J. & CoNST., Feb. 24, 1994, at DI.
44. See Buchman, supra note 29, at 46. North Carolina first allowed interstate
branching in 1993 through the North Carolina Interstate Branch Banking Act. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 53-219 to 53-224.8 (1994), repealed by 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws ch. 322, § 1.
This legislation was repealed when North Carolina opted in to Riegle-Neal. See N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 53-224.10.
45. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-224.10. North Carolina allows de novo branching on a
reciprocal basis until June 1, 1999, and has no aging laws. See id. § 53-224.12; see
generally id. § 53-224.10 to .31.
46. See Robert Trigaux, Pulling Florida's Banks Strings, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Sept.
7, 1997, at IH, 6H. North Carolina is home to NationsBank, the third largest BHC, First
Union, the sixth largest BHC, and Wachovia, the seventeenth largest BHC in the United
States, based on total assets. See Doug Campbell, Wachovia Moving Into Insurance
Market, GREENSBORO NEWS & RECORD, Feb. 2, 1998, at B4; First Union Corp. Purchase of
Wheat First, Broker Firm, Is Completed, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 1998, at B 16; Matt Murray &
Rick Brooks, Regions Offers $2.7 Billion for First Commercial, WALL ST. J., Feb. 9, 1998,
at AS.
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Carolina banks find themselves on the buying side of the equation."
As a state, North Carolina generally need not worry about lost jobs
resulting from bank mergers because North Carolina banks are
usually the acquirers, not the targets. 8 Thus, the rapid expansion of
North Carolina's banks illustrates that some states have a head start
on interstate branching, which they may use to become even
stronger, thereby drawing away valuable commodities like bank
charters and jobs from other states.49
2. States Opting Out of Riegle-Neal
Texas and Montana are the only states that opted out of
Riegle-Neal's interstate branching provisions." Although initially
opting out, Texas will reconsider interstate branching in 1999,5' and
Montana will permit interstate branching beginning October 1,
2001 .12 Although Montana opted out of Riegle-Neal, it amended its
laws to allow statewide branching for the first time beginning July 1,
1997.5' Like Montana banks, Texas banks could not branch
47. In 1996, NationsBank bought St. Louis-based Boatmen's Bancshares, Inc. See
Alman, supra note 39, at 31. In 1997, NationsBank acquired Florida's Barnett Banks,
making it the largest bank in Florida. See Merger of NationsBank and Barnett is Approved,
NAT'L L.J., Dec. 22, 1997, at B2. Likewise, First Union became the number one bank in
Virginia by merging with Signet Banking Corp., and it recently announced an agreement to
merge with CoreStates Financial. See First Union Corp./Corestates Financial Corp.,
LEGAL TIMEs, Dec. 1, 1997, at 19; Steven Lipin & Eleena De Lisser, First Union To Buy
Signet In Stock Swap, WALL ST. J., July 21, 1997, at A3. In October, First Union also
merged with Covenant Bancorp of New Jersey. See First Union Completes Purchase,
WALL ST. J., Jan. 19, 1998, at B12. After becoming the number two bank in Virginia by
merging with Jefferson Bankshares, Wachovia merged with Central Fidelity Banks, another
Virginia bank. See Southeast Wachovia/Central Fidelity Banks, AM. LAW., Sept. 1997, at
93. Wachovia also recently acquired Florida's First United Bancorp. See Rich Brooks,
Wachovia to Take After-Tax Charge of$205 Million Related to Mergers, WALL ST. J., Dec.
22, 1997, at Al1.
48. See supra note 47; cf Alman, supra note 39, at 31-32 (explaining that some states'
leaders fear that increased bank consolidation will cause a loss of jobs and corporate offices
from their states).
49. See Alman, supra note 39, at 31-32; infra notes 63-70 and accompanying text.
50. See TEX. FiN. CODE ANN. § 32.0095 (West 1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 32-1-381(2)
(1997).
51. Texas' opt-out legislation sunsets on September 2, 1999. See TEX. FIN. CODE ANN.
§ 32.0095(c).
52. See MoNT. CODE ANN. § 32-1-370.
53. Formerly, Montana banks were only permitted to branch within their home and
adjoining counties. See id. § 32-1-372.
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statewide until recently. 4 Therefore, Montana and Texas almost
certainly had a protectionist motive for opting out: providing their
own banks time to branch into other regions of the state before out-
of-state banks seize the opportunity. Texas, known for its opposition
to interstate branching," also may have decided to opt out because it
has no mega-banks like North Carolina's NationsBank, First Union,
or Wachovia. 6  Thus, it is likely that many Texas banks are not
interested in interstate branching. Additionally, in the mid-1980s,
many Texas banks became insolvent and were acquired by out-of-
state BHCs like NationsBank and BankAmerica. 7 Therefore, many
out-of-state BHCs already have a strong foothold in Texas and do not
need to utilize Riegle-Neal's interstate branching provision to expand
into the Texas market. 8
54. In 1988, a federal court ruled that because Texas state-chartered savings and loans
enjoy statewide branching privileges, national banks could also engage in statewide
branching within Texas pursuant to the McFadden Act. See Texas v. Clarke, 690 F. Supp.
573 (W.D. Tex. 1988). Subsequently, the Texas State Banking Commission ruled that both
state and national banks could branch statewide under the Texas Constitution. See Leonard
Bierman et al., Regulatory Change and the Availability of Banking Facilities in Low-
Income Areas: A Texas Empirical Study, 49 SMU L. REv. 1421, 1429 (1996). In 1989, the
Texas Legislature explicitly authorized statewide branching for all banks. See id.
55. Texas has vehemently fought the OCC's determination that national banks can
utilize the National Bank Act's thirty-mile rule to relocate their headquarters to an adjacent
state while retaining branches in the former state. See Ghiglieri v. Sun World, N.A., 117
F.3d 309 (5th Cir. 1997), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3493 (U.S. Dec. 23, 1997)
(No. 97-1078) (upholding the OCC's approval); Ghiglieri v. Ludwig, 125 F.3d 941 (5th
Cir. 1997), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3493 (U.S. Dec. 23, 1997) (No. 97-1078)
(upholding the OCC's approval); see also supra note 26; infra notes 63-70 and
accompanying text. The outcome of these decisions has little importance to banks now
because as of June 1, 1997, this method of interstate branching is no longer permissible in
states that have opted out of interstate branching. See 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 30(c), 36(e)(2) (West
Supp. 1997). However, banks that did utilize this method of interstate branching may be
able to use these branches as deposit production branches. See infra notes 82-85 and
accompanying text. In addition, these branches may possibly be used to branch intrastate.
See supra note 26; infra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
56. See Rollinger, supra note 1, at 252. Texas' largest bank in terms of assets is
NationsBank of Texas, which ranks 17th nationwide. See Top 100 U.S. Commercial Banks
in Total Assets, AM. BANKER, Oct. 24, 1997, at 8.
57. After the OPEC oil embargo, crude oil prices climbed. See Bierman, supra note
54, at 1427. In response to this financial surge, extant Texas banks enlarged their
operations and many new banks were formed. See id. When crude oil prices collapsed in
1986, the Texas banking industry collapsed as well. See id. In response, the Texas
Legislature loosened its restrictive acquisition and branching regulations in order to attract
out-of-state banks to buy failed Texas banks. See id. at 1428. Out-of-state BHCs now
control one-third of Texas' deposits. See Rollinger, supra note 1, at 252.
58. See Rollinger, supra note 1, at 252-53.
238 [Vol. 2
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The fact that Texas and Montana opted out of interstate
branching will not stop banks from entering these two states.5 9 The
ability to branch nationwide through federal savings banks,6" to own
banks in multiple states within a BHC structure,6 and to use bank
affiliates as agents62 mitigates the opt-out choice. However, more
direct attempts to circumvent state opt-out legislation may cause
friction. Currently, NationsBank is involved in a battle with the
Texas Banking Commissioner over its efforts to convert its Texas
banking network into a series of interstate branches. Not wanting to
wait until 1999 when Texas' opt-out provision sunsets, NationsBank
is attempting to convert its NationsBank of Texas operations into a
series of branches of its main national bank headquartered in
Charlotte, North Carolina. In the first part of a multi-step
transaction, NationsBank utilized the National Bank Act's thirty-mile
rule63 before it expired on June 1, 1997. First, NationsBank relocated
the headquarters of Sun World, N.A. (Sun World), an indirect
subsidiary bank of its BHC, from El Paso, Texas, to Santa Teresa,
59. See Alman, supra note 39, at 28; see also infra notes 63-66 and accompanying text.
60. A federal savings bank may branch into any state, regardless of whether the state
has opted in or opted out of Riegle-Neal. See Herlihy, supra note 24, at 439. In
illustration, BankAmerica, the fifth largest BHC in the United States, controls an Oregon
thrift that applied to the Office of Thrift Supervision in 1995 to open 274 full-service
branches in all fifty states. See id. However, even though the permissible activities of
federal savings banks have been expanded in recent years, national banks still enjoy broader
activity powers. See 12 U.S.C. § 1464(c) (1994); 12 U.S.C.A. § 1467a(c)(1) (West Supp.
1997) (implications for thrift holding companies); J. Virgil Mattingly & Kieran J. Fallon,
Understanding the Issues Raised by Financial Modernization, 2 N.C. BANKING INST. 25
(1998); JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, BANKING LAW AND REGULATION
404-406 (2d ed. 1997).
61. BHC structures will not become extinct under Riegle-Neal because they will be
used to operate in opt-out states and to meet special needs. See Rollinger, supra note 1, at
263-67; Bill McConnell, Interstate Starts Sunday; Impact Will Take Longer, AM. BANKER,
May 30, 1997, at 2. For example, because Chase Manhattan Corporation owns Texas
Commerce Bank in Houston, Chase Manhattan will keep its BHC structure. See
McConnell, supra. Also, state-chartered banks, like Chase Manhattan, may be required by
state or federal regulators to operate their "Section 20" securities affiliates as a BHC
subsidiary rather than as an operating subsidiary. See id. Because the OCC decided to
permit national banks to engage in "securities underwriting and other activities through an
operating subsidiary," national banks now have less of an incentive to keep their BHC
structures. Id.
62. See 12 U.S.C. § 1828(r)(2). "Bank affiliates" are banks controlled, either through
stock ownership or otherwise, by the same BHC. See id. § 221a(b)(2). Bank affiliates have
limited power and are not equivalent to establishing a branch. See Rollinger, supra note 1,
at 256.
63. See supra notes 26, 38, 55 and accompanying text.
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New Mexico, less than three miles away, retaining Sun World's two
existing branches in El Paso and establishing a new branch at Sun
World's former headquarters in El Paso.' Then, upon the Office of
the Comptroller of the Currency's (OCC) approval, NationsBank
merged Sun World with its flagship bank, NationsBank, N.A.,
headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina.6 ' As the last step in this
series of transactions, NationsBank is attempting to merge
NationsBank of Texas, N.A., another indirect subsidiary bank of its
BHC, into NationsBank, N.A., thus converting its Texas branches
into interstate branches. 66  If successful, NationsBank will by-pass
Texas' ban on interstate branching.
64. See Ghiglieri v. Sun World, N.A., 117 F.3d 309, 310-11 (5th Cir. 1997), petition
for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3493 (U.S. Dec. 23, 1997) (No. 97-1078). In Sun World, the
Fifth Circuit upheld the OCC's approval of these steps under the deferential Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. standard. See id. at 313, 316 (citing
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 841-43
(1984)). The court found that 12 U.S.C. §§ 30(b) and 36 are silent as to the validity of
these transactions and held that the OCC's interpretation of these statutes is a permissible
construction. See id. at 316.
65. See Brief for Respondent NationsBank, N.A. in Opposition at ii, Ghiglieri v. Sun
World, N.A., 117 F.3d 309 (5th Cir. 1997), petition for cert. filed, 66 U.S.L.W. 3493 (U.S.
Dec. 23, 1997) (No. 97-1078). The OCC granted approval for this merger and the merger
was completed on January 15, 1998. See id.
66. See Bill McConnell, Texas Fights NationsBank End Run on Branching, AM.
BANKER, Dec. 30, 1997, at 2; Bank Delays Merger Plan for Texas, HOUSTON CHRONICLE,
Dec. 17, 1997, at 4, available in 1997 WL 13078321. NationsBank relies on two
arguments for the validity of this merger. First, NationsBank asserts that, independent of
Riegle-Neal, the National Bank Act permits "mergers between [national] banks 'located
[with]in the same state' even if headquartered in separate states." McConnell, supra; see 12
U.S.C. § 215a(a). Thus, NationsBank argues that by virtue of the merger of Sun World,
which operates branches in Texas, into NationsBank, N.A, NationsBank, N.A. is now
"located" in Texas for purposes of 12 U.S.C. § 215a(a). As a result, NationsBank believes
it can now merge NationsBank, N.A. with NationsBank of Texas, N.A. because they are
"located within the same state."
Furthermore, NationsBank asserts that the legislation Texas enacted to opt out of
Riegle-Neal is flawed. See McConnell, supra. In order to opt out of Riegle-Neal's
interstate merger transaction provision, a state had to enact nondiscriminatory legislation
that "(i) applies equally to all out-of-[s]tate banks; and (ii) expressly prohibits merger
transactions involving out-of-Is]tate banks." 12 U.S.C. § 183lu(a)(2)(A). Based on this
statutory language, NationsBank maintains that because Texas' opt-out legislation fails to
prohibit mergers with state savings banks, the legislation is discriminatory and is ineffective
to prohibit interstate merger transactions with national banks. See id. § 1813(a)(1)-(2)
(establishing that a state savings bank is considered a "bank" under federal law); Cf id §
183 lu(a)(2)(A); McConnell, supra.
As of March 3, 1998, the OCC was still considering the merger application.
However, NationsBank has agreed to postpone the merger for up to thirty days following
regulatory approval. See Bank Delays Merger Plan for Texas, supra.
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Arguing that NationsBank is violating Texas' opt-out law, the
Texas Banking Commissioner is fighting NationsBank's attempt to
establish an interstate branching network within Texas.67  If
NationsBank succeeds, Texas-chartered banks will be at a
competitive disadvantage with NationsBank, which can better take
advantage of economies of scale.68 In addition, Texas will stand to
lose tax revenue69 unless it thoroughly revises its tax laws." If
NationsBank's legal arguments are successful, the transaction will
illustrate the ability of banks to circumvent state opt-out legislation.
3. Permissible State Protectionism Under Riegle-Neal
Opting out of interstate branching is not the only way for a
state to protect its banks. Riegle-Neal incorporated some protections
for states and their economies. After opting in, Riegle-Neal allows
states to exercise control over interstate branching through state
aging laws,7 de novo branching prohibitions," and deposit cap
67. See McConnell, supra note 66.
68. See Scott Park, Texans Decry OCC 'Private Agenda,' REGULATORY COMPLIANCE
WATCH, Dec. 8, 1997, available in LEXIS, BANKNG Library, ABBB file.
69. See Bank Delays Merger Plan for Texas, supra note 66, at 4. The Texas Banking
Commissioner asserts that Texas stands to lose $10 million in tax revenues if the merger
occurs. NationsBank disputes this figure, but agrees that the merger will result in a loss of
some tax revenue for Texas.
70. The Texas Legislature did revise its franchise tax laws, effective January 1, 1998.
See TEx. TAX CODE ANN. § 171.001 (1992 & West Supp. 1998). The Texas franchise tax is
imposed on "each corporation that does business in [Texas] or that is chartered or
authorized to do business in [Texas] ... ." Id. § 171.001(a)(1) (1992). Prior to the 1997
amendment, the definition of "corporation" did not explicitly include banks; therefore, only
• banks chartered in Texas were explicitly subject to the franchise tax. See id. §
171.001(b)(2). In 1997, the Texas Legislature included "banking corporations" (which
include national banks) within the franchise tax definition of "corporation," bringing all
banks within its realm. See id. § 171.001(b)(3) (West Supp. 1998). Despite this revision,
other Texas state tax issues will contribute to a loss of tax revenue resulting from the
merger.
71. Aging laws safeguard a bank's franchise value by prohibiting out-of-state banks
from forming a new banking subsidiary in a state and then merging with it as a means of
entering the state. See Buchman, supra note 29, at 47. A state may require a bank to be in
existence for no more than five years before it can be acquired by an out-of-state bank. See
12 U.S.C. § 1831u(a)(5)(A). The effect aging laws will have on interstate merger
transactions is unclear because acquirers generally are only interested in buying banks with
over $1 billion in assets, and these banks are usually more than five years old. See
Buchman, supra note 29, at 50. Yet, aging laws may affect many smaller banks located
near state lines that are predicted to account for the vast amount of interstate mergers under
Riegle-Neal. See McConnell, supra note 61, at 2.
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restrictions." Most states prohibit de novo branching and dictate that
banks must either merge with an existing bank or acquire a branch of
an existing bank within the state.74 Additionally, states have the
power to mandate filing requirements for interstate bank mergers and
may disapprove a merger for substantial noncompliance with these
requirements."
At least thirty states require banks to be in existence three to five years before being
acquired. See All But Few States Beat Trigger Date On Nationwide Branching, supra note
41, at 12. Twelve states, including North Carolina, have no aging laws. See id.; see also
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-224.12 (Supp. 1997). For an overview of each state's interstate
branching legislation, see generally All But Few States Beat Trigger Date On Nationwide
Branching, supra note 41.
72. See 12 U.S.C. § 36(g) (national banks); id. § 1828(d)(4) (state banks). A "de novo
branch" is defined as "a branch ... which is originally established by the [national or state]
bank as a branch; and does not become a branch of such bank as a result of... [an interstate
merger or acquisition transaction]." 12 U.S.C. §§ 36(g)(3)(A), 1828(d)(4)(C). If a state
chooses not to force banks to buy their way into the state, the criteria for opening de novo
branches closely resemble those for interstate mergers: state filing, community
reinvestment, capital adequacy, and management requirements. See 12 U.S.C. 36(g)(1)(A);
O'Neal, supra note 36, at 28.
73. An interstate merger transaction will not be approved if the resulting entity and its
affiliates "would control more than 10% of the total amount of deposits of insured
depository institutions in the United States ... [or] would control 30% or more of the total
amount of deposits of insured depository institutions" in any state in which any two banks
involved in the transaction both have branches. 12 U.S.C. § 183 lu(b)(2)(A)-(B). However,
a state can make these deposit caps more or less stringent. See id § 1831 u(b)(2)(C)-(D).
Affiliated banks that merge do not have to meet these requirements. See id. §
183lu(b)(2)(E). Although the purpose of deposit cap restrictions is to prevent excessive
concentration of power, a state's low deposit cap may stunt geographic expansion, hinder
competition, and prevent its own banks from being acquired by out-of-state banks. See
Buchman, supra note 29, at 49.
74. At least thirty-four jurisdictions completely prohibit de novo branching, while
eleven jurisdictions, including North Carolina, permit it on a reciprocal basis. See N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 53-224.12, .14 (Supp. 1997) (restricting de novo branching until June 1,
1999); All But Few States Beat Trigger Date On Nationwide Branching, supra note 41, at
12. Four jurisdictions allow unrestricted de novo branching. See All But Few States Beat
Trigger Date On Nationwide Branching, supra note 41, at 12. Interstate mergers and
acquisitions will increase under Riegle-Neal because states that prohibit de novo branching
typically require acquirers to purchase an entire bank rather than only one branch of a bank.
See id. But see N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-224.14 (establishing that, prior to June 1, 1999, out-
of-state banks may purchase one branch of a North Carolina bank rather than the entire
bank only if the home state of the out-of-state bank allows North Carolina banks to do the
same). States that require acquisition of an entire bank also adopted five-year aging laws.
See All But Few States Beat Trigger Date On Nationwide Branching, supra note 41, at 12.
75. A state's filing requirements must be nondiscriminatory and can be no stricter than
requirements for out-of-state nonbanking corporations wanting to do business in the state.
See 12 U.S.C. § 1831u(b)(1)(A); see, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 53-224.20 (Supp. 1997).
When the interstate merger transaction includes only national banks, only the filing
requirements permitted under 12 U.S.C. § 1831u(b)(1) must be met. See, e.g., OCC
Corporate Decision No. 96-29, Decision of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency of
the Applications to Merge First Interstate Bank of Alaska, N.A., Anchorage, Alaska, First
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Riegle-Neal also protects opt-in states from "deposit
siphoning. 76  As of October 10, 1997, new regulations adopted
pursuant to section 109 of Riegle-Nea' bar banks from using
interstate branches acquired or established under Riegle-Neal
primarily for deposit production.7" After one year, the primary
federal regulator examines an interstate branch's "statewide loan-to-
deposit ratio," which cannot be less than fifty percent of the "host
state's loan-to-deposit ratio."79  If an interstate branch's statewide
loan-to-deposit ratio is below fifty percent, the primary federal
regulator may consider whether the branch "is reasonably helping to
meet the credit needs of the communities in the host state that are
served by the bank."8" Otherwise, the regulator may impose
sanctions, such as closing the interstate branch or restricting the bank
from opening other interstate branches."
Interstate Bank of Idaho, N. A., Boise, Idaho, First Interstate Bank of Nevada, N.A., Las
Vegas, Nevada, First Interstate Bank of New Mexico, N.A., Santa Fe, New Mexico, Bank
of Utah, N.A., Salt Lake City, Utah, With and Into Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., San Francisco,
California, at *27 n.11 (June 1, 1996), available in LEXIS, BANKNG Library, OCCPL
File.
76. "Deposit siphoning" refers to the practice of collecting deposits in one state and
using those deposits to make loans in a different state. See Rollinger, supra note 1, at 230.
77. The purpose of section 109 is to ensure that interstate branches are meeting the
community's credit needs, and it mandates that banks cannot use interstate branches
primarily for deposit production. See H.R. CoNF. REP. No. 103-651, at 62 (1994), reprinted
in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2039, 2083; Prohibition Against use of Interstate Branches Primarily
for Deposit Production, 62 Fed. Reg. 47,728, 47,734 (1997) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §
25.61). In section 109, Congress required the federal banking agencies to formulate
regulations forbidding the use of interstate branches primarily for deposit production. See
12 U.S.C. 1835a(a).
78. See Prohibition Against use of Interstate Branches Primarily for Deposit
Production, 62 Fed. Reg. at 47,734-37. The OCC, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation,
and Federal Reserve Board proposed these regulations. See FDIC Approves Interagency
Final Rule to Ban Interstate Branch Deposit Production, 69 Banking Rep. (BNA) 355
(Sept. 8, 1997).
79. See Prohibition Against use of Interstate Branches Primarily for Deposit
Production, 62 Fed. Reg. at 47,735-37 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 25.63 (national banks);
id. § 208.28(c) (state member banks); id. § 369.3 (state nonmember banks)). A bank's
"statewide loan-to-deposit ratio" is defined as "the ratio of the bank's loans to its deposits in
a state in which the bank has one or more [covered] interstate branches, as determined by
the [appropriate federal regulator]." Id. at 47,735 (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 25.62(h)
(national banks)). "Host state loan-to-deposit ratio" refers to "the ratio of total loans in the
host state relative to total deposits from the host state for all banks... that have that state as
their home state ...." Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 25.62(f) (national banks)).
80. Id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 25.64(a)). For the six factors considered in
making this determination, see, e.g., id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. § 25.64(b) (national
banks)).
81. See id. (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. §§ 25.65 (national banks); FDIC Approves
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Despite these new regulations prohibiting deposit siphoning,
some banks may find a loophole, one that is thirty-miles wide.82
Because the deposit production regulations were adopted pursuant to
Riegle-Neal, national bank branches established under the thirty-mile
rule or interstate branches existing before the June 1, 1997 deadline
are exempt." Thus, these branches could be used as deposit
production offices. In regard to this possibility, the OCC stated "that
new branches established under the law [Riegle-Neal] would cause
all branches [within that host state] to fall under the deposit
production prohibition."' How many national banks slipped through
these loopholes is unclear, but according to the OCC, "this number
might fall as the banks engage in Riegle-Neal branching, which
would bring them under the new rule." 5
III. THE NEED FOR THE AMENDMENTS ACT
A. The Nationwide Cooperative Agreement and the Nationwide
State-Federal Supervisory Agreement
As June 1, 1997 approached, there was uncertainty over
whether home or host state laws apply to interstate branches and
which state regulates interstate branches.8 6 Originally, Riegle-Neal
provided that host state law would govern the activities of state bank
interstate branches.8 7 Unlike national banks, state banks would have
had the additional burden of complying with many different state
laws concerning permissible banking activities. 88 In 1996, due to
Interagency Final Rule to Ban Interstate Branch Deposit Production, supra note 78, at 355.
82. See 12 U.S.C. 30(b) (1994); supra notes 55, 64 and accompanying text.
83. See FDIC Approves Interagency Final Rule to Ban Interstate Branch Deposit
Production, supra note 78, at 355.
84. Id. (statement of Julie Williams, Chief Counsel, OCC).
85. Deposit Production Branches Banned By New Rule, Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
No. 1718 (Aug. 29, 1997); see supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
86. See H.k 1306-The Riegle-Neal Clarification Act of 1997: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. and Consumer Credit of the House Comm. on Banking and Fin.
Servs., 105th Cong. 8 (1997) [hereinafter H.R. 1306 Hearing] (testimony of John Traier,
Deputy Commissioner of Banking for the State of New Jersey, on behalf of the Conference
of State Bank Supervisors); see infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
87. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831a(j) (1994), amendedby 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831a(j) (West Supp.
4 1997).
88. See H.R. 1306 Hearing, supra note 86, at 14 (testimony of John Bley, Chairman of
the Interstate Task Force for the Conference of State Bank Supervisors).
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concern that this burden and uncertainty would cause state banks to
convert to national bank charters, 9 bank supervisors from all fifty
states, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Federal
Reserve Board entered into the Nationwide Cooperative Agreement
(Cooperative Agreement)," and the Nationwide State-Federal
Supervisory Agreement (Supervisory Agreement).9' These
agreements authorize the home state regulator to be the primary
supervisor and regulator of state bank interstate branches.92 Host
state regulators, however, will "participate in examinations for
compliance with [host state laws]" on consumer protection, fair
lending, intrastate branching, community reinvestment, and other
applicable laws, as well as "provide the home state supervisor with
guidance on the application of [host] state laws." 93 The host state
regulator, in an emergency, may also conduct an independent
examination of the interstate branch if the home state regulator
would be unable to do so within a reasonable period of time, or, upon
proper notice to the home state regulator, "take any enforcement
action ... permitted under host state law."94  Currently, the
Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS)95 is working on a
uniform test for all state regulators to use in evaluating interstate
branches.96
89. See infra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
90. See Nationwide Cooperative Agreement, Nov. 13, 1996 (visited on Mar. 3, 1998)
<http://www.csbsdal.org/newsPR/agreementl.html>.
91. See Nationwide State-Federal Supervisory Agreement, Nov. 14, 1996 (visited on
Mar. 3, 1998) <http://www.csbsdal.org/newsPR/agreement2.html>.
92. See Nationwide Cooperative Agreement, supra note 90, at Section 2.3; see
generally Nationwide State-Federal Supervisory Agreement, supra note 91. The
Amendments Act does not alter this aspect of the Cooperative Agreement and Supervisory
Agreement. See generally 12 U.S.C. §§ 183la(j), 36(f)(1)(C) (West Supp. 4 1997).
Although the host state regulator is familiar with the local community and their needs, the
home state regulator does not know the community where the state bank interstate branch is
located.
93. Nationwide Cooperative Agreement, supra note 90, at § 4.2.
94. Id. at §§ 4.2, 5.2.
95. The CSBS is an association of state regulators who regulate and supervise
approximately 6,802 state-chartered banks. See The Financial Services Competitiveness
Act of 1997: Hearings Before the Subcomm. On Fin. and Hazardous Materials of the
House Comm. on Commerce, 105th Cong. 160 (1997) [hereinafter Financial Services
Competitiveness Act Hearings] (prepared statement of Catherine A. Ghiglieri, Banking
Commissioner of Texas, on behalf of the CSBS).
96. See Mitchell, supra note 23.
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Although the roles of the home and host state regulators were
undisputed, attorneys and the CSBS disagreed over which state's
laws applied to state bank interstate branches under Riegle-Neal, as
originally enacted.97  The CSBS interpreted the Cooperative
Agreement, the Supervisory Agreement, and Riegle-Neal as giving
the home state control over general charter issues like lending limits,
while some attorneys believed that host state laws applied.98
Furthermore, the CSBS argued that under Riegle-Neal national bank
interstate branches would have a competitive advantage over state
bank interstate branches.99 The CSBS reasoned that under the
original version of Riegle-Neal, state bank interstate branches could
not engage in an activity if it is impermissible under host state law,
even if home state law permits the activity, and even though a
national bank interstate branch in the host state could engage in the
same activity.' Due to this uncertainty over which state law applies
and the potential disadvantages for state-chartered banks, some
believed Riegle-Neal created an incentive for state-chartered banks to
convert to a national charter in order to avoid this dilemma.'
National charters also appeared more attractive than state
charters because the National Bank Act governs the scope of
permissible national bank activities.0 2 Because national banks are
subject to this one body of law,0 3 they "can sell the same product and
97. See HR 1306 Hearing, supra note 86, at 8-9 (testimony of John Traier, Deputy
Commissioner of Banking for the State of New Jersey, on behalf of the CSBS).
98. See id.; Nationwide Cooperative Agreement, supra note 90, at Section 6.2.
99. See HIP 1306 Hearing, supra note 86, at 9 (testimony of John Traier, Deputy
Commissioner of Banking for the State of New Jersey, on behalf of the CSBS).
100. See id.
101. See id. at 32 (statement of Anthony S. Abbate on behalf of the Independent
Bankers Association of America). Additional incentives to choose a national charter over a
state charter include the prestige of a national charter and the fact that state-chartered banks
have the additional burden of answering to the state regulator where they are chartered.
102. See 12 U.S.C. § 24 (Seventh) (1994).
103. While national banks can engage in any activity allowed under the National Bank
Act, under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA),
activities of FDIC-insured state banks are limited to those permitted for national banks,
unless the state bank complies with capital adequacy standards and the FDIC determines
that the activity will not pose a risk to the safety and soundness of the bank. See Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, 12 U.S.C.A § 1831 a(a)(1) (West
Supp. 1997). Specific exceptions exist to this general rule, however, for insurance
underwriting and equity investments. See id. § 1831 a(b)-(c) (state banks can neither engage
in an insurance underwriting activity if it is impermissible for national banks, nor hold
equity investments that are impermissible for national banks, except for investments in
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services [in any state] without reference to state law,"' 14 unless an
exception exists giving states the ability to regulate an activity
regardless of federal action.0 5 If host state law governs a state bank
interstate branch's activities, state banks would be forced to comply
with several different sets of laws. 10 6  As a result, cost savings
realized by combining banking operations would not include
diminished monitoring costs. 1 7  Although state-chartered banks
generally enjoy lower examination fees, broader affiliation powers,
and regulators who are familiar with the local community and
market,'0 8 a national charter could have appeared more attractive to
banks wanting to engage in interstate branching. 09
Due to these incentives to have a national charter for
interstate branching purposes, commentators recognized that the dual
banking system might be threatened."0 If several state banks were to
switch to a national charter, the state banking system might
degenerate, weakening states' control over financial issues within
their borders."' State banks are important to the banking industry
majority-owned subsidiaries). Furthermore, prior to Riegle-Neal, thirty-five states already
had laws permitting state banks to engage in the same activities allowed for national banks.
See infra notes 132-37 and accompanying text. Therefore, in those states, national banks
would not have had a great activity advantage over state banks without the Amendments
Act. Nevertheless, the Amendments Act was necessary to answer the question of whether
and when home or host state law applies to interstate branches. See supra notes 86, 97-101
and accompanying text.
104. H.R 1306 Hearing, supra note 86, at 32 (testimony of Anthony Abbate on behalf
of the Independent Bankers Association of America).
105. For example, the McCarran-Ferguson Act reverses the general rule of federal
preemption and provides that state laws which "specifically relate[s] to the business of
insurance" preempt conflicting federal laws regarding insurance. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b).
106. See Mitchell, supra note 23, at 31. Because securities, insurance, lending, bank fee,
and other banking laws can vary by state, compliance can be time intensive and create
operational inefficiencies, "possibly to the extent of jeopardizing the economic viability of
offering new products and services." Clyde Mitchell, Interstate Branching and the
International Scene, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 20, 1997, at 3. Even under the Amendments Act, state
and national banks with interstate branches will incur costs from monitoring compliance
with varying host state laws on community reinvestment, consumer protection, fair lending,
and intrastate branching, as well as other host state laws that apply to national banks. See
12 U.S.C.A. 183 1aa)(1) (West Supp. 4 1997).
107. See Mitchell, supra note 23, at 31.
108. See McConnell, supra note 61, at 2.
109. See id.
110. See H.R. 1306 Hearing, supra note 86, at 2 (opening statement of Representative
Marge Roukema, Chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and
Consumer Credit).
111. See id. at 54 ("If [state-chartered banks] move toward a national charter, states will
lose a great deal of their current ability to influence economic growth and productivity.")
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because they help address customers needs by testing innovative
services." 2 For example, ATMs, NOW accounts, electronic funds,
adjustable rate mortgages, and even checking accounts originated in
state banks."3 Because most state banks operate on a smaller scale
than national banks, limiting the risk to the state's economy and the
federal deposit insurance fund, state banks are ideal for testing new
banking activities." 4  If state legislatures dislike the effects of the
new activities, they can repeal the enabling legislation." 5
Conversely, if states allow state-chartered banks to continue the
activities, national banks will request permission to engage in the
activities. Therefore, a healthy dual banking system is desirable
because it promotes competition and innovation within the banking
industry, which translates into better services for consumers.
B. The Amendments Act
To keep state charters viable and competitive with national
charters, the CSBS lobbied Congress to clarify whether home or host
state law applies to state bank interstate branches." 6 The CSBS
argued that the Amendments Act would (1) reduce federal
preemption of state law, (2) maintain the competitiveness of state
charters by creating a level playing field between state and national
bank activities, and (3) preserve the dual banking system by ensuring
that neither charter has an unfair advantage over the other." 7 Federal
legislators agreed, arguing that if an incentive exists for state banks
to switch to national charters for interstate branching purposes, then
"a solely national bank system" would exist."' Contending that state
(testimony of Senator Margaret Prentice, Ranking Member of the Washington State Senate
Financial Institutions Committee).
112. See Financial Services Competitiveness Act Hearings, supra note 95, at 161





116. See Which Laws Should Govern Out-of-State State-Chartered Banks, Fed. Banking
L. Rep. (CCH) No. 1695, at 3 (Mar. 21, 1997).
117. See HR. 1306 Hearing, supra note 86, at 7-22 (testimony of John Traier, Deputy
Commissioner of Banking for the State of New Jersey, on behalf of the Conference of State
Bank Supervisors).
118. Bill McConnell, Easier Route to Interstate Sought for State Banks, AM. BANKER, at
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banks would not be granted new powers, Representative Marge
Roukema (R-NJ) stated that the Amendments Act "only allows state
banks to exercise powers national banks could exercise. It gives
parity to all banks so that state banks are not discriminated against in
the growing interstate system while protecting the consumers' rights
... ,119 Some Congressmen, however, worried that the OCC's
continuing efforts to expand national bank powers and preempt state
laws would negatively affect consumers.
1 21
In response to these concerns, Congress removed the
perceived unfair advantage for national banks by passing the Riegle-
Neal Amendments Act of 1997,121 which provides state banks
equality with national banks in interstate branching. 12 2  First, the
Amendments Act allows state banks to retain the activity powers of
their home state charter at interstate branches to the extent that either
a national bank interstate branch in the host state or a host state-
chartered bank has the power to engage in such activities. 12  For
example, a North Carolina-chartered bank with a branch in Virginia
may engage in an activity allowed under North Carolina law if a
national bank interstate branch located in Virginia or a Virginia-
chartered bank may do so. If the Virginia-chartered bank can sell
mutual funds, so can a North Carolina bank's interstate branch
located in Virginia if its North Carolina charter allows. If a Virginia-
chartered bank cannot sell mutual funds, but a national bank
interstate branch located in Virginia can, then the North Carolina
bank's interstate branch, if its North Carolina charter allows, can also
sell mutual funds.
2 (May 1, 1997) (quoting Representative Marge Roukema, Chairwoman of the
Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit).
119. Interstate Banking Amendments Pass House, Now Headed for White House, 68
Banking Rep. (BNA) 1235, (June 30, 1997) (quoting Representative Marge Roukema,
Chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and Consumer Credit).
120. See H.R? 1306 Hearing, supra note 86, at 4 ("The impact of the legislation on
consumers is unclear. Consumers could be hurt by weaker standards.") (quoting
Representative Bruce Vento, Ranking Minority Member of the Subcommittee on Financial
Institutions and Consumer Credit); Pamela Atkins, Senate Unanimously Approves Interstate
Amendments Bill Aimed at Keeping State Banking Charters Viable Option for Banks, 68
Banking Rep. (BNA) 1126, 1126 (June 16, 1997) ("This bill requires the Comptroller to
report to us on all past and future state charter pre-emptions. We will keep a close watch to
ensure that consumers aren't endangered.") (quoting Senator Alfonse D'Amato).
121. 12 U.S.C.A. §§ 183 1a(j), 36(f)(1)(C) (West Supp. 4 1997).
122. See id. § 183la(); see also supra notes 117-19 and accompanying text.
123. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 183 la(j)(2).
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Second, the Amendments Act provides that host state law
applies to state bank interstate branches to the same extent it does to
national bank interstate branches. 14 Federal law, however, may still
preempt host state law, and if so, state bank interstate branches are
not required to comply with the preempted state law.22 To alert
Congress of OCC actions involving the preemption of state laws, the
Amendments Act requires the OCC to report annually to Congress
any actions taken regarding the applicability of state laws to national
banks. 1
26
IV. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE AMENDMENTS ACT
The most significant aspect of the Amendments Act is its
very existence-the uncertainty regarding which state's laws apply to
state bank interstate branches harbored by regulators, banks, and
attorneys is, for the most part, no longer a concern.' 27 However, the
methods that Congress used to create this legal certainty-the
individual provisions of the Amendments Act-have collateral
significance to the dual banking system.
A. Achieving Competitive Equality Versus Maintaining State
Control Over Banking
The overarching theme within the Amendments Act is the
establishment of competitive equality between all banks in order to
preserve the dual banking system.12 1 Yet, as each individual
provision of the Amendments Act illustrates, the structure through
124. See id. § 1831a(j)(1).
125. See id. Absent federal preemption, 12 U.S.C.A. § 183la(j)(1) gives host states
some definite control over areas of special economic importance to states. See id.; see also
OCC Interpretive Letter 572, State Law Requiring Consumer Transaction Accounts
Preempted, [1991-1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 83,342, at 71,475
(Jan. 15, 1992) [hereinafter OCC Interpretive Letter 572] (discussing situations where
federal law can preempt state law). When federal law preempts host state law, state bank
interstate branches must comply with applicable home state laws. See 12 U.S.C.A. §
183 la(j)(1).
126. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 36(f)(1)(C).
127. See supra notes 86, 97-101 and accompanying text.
128. See supra notes 87-89, 99-115 and accompanying text.
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which Congress achieved this goal conflicts with retaining the
meaningful benefits of the dual banking system.
1. An insured [s]tate bank that establishes a branch in a host
[s]tate may conduct any activity at such branch that is
permissible under the laws of the home [s]tate of such
bank, to the extent such activity is permissible ... for a
[national bank interstate] branch in the host state.. .129
Perceiving that state bank interstate branches would be at a
disadvantage if host state law governs their activities,13 Congress
authorized these branches, if their home state charter allows, to
engage in activities that are permissible for a national bank interstate
branch in a host state. 3' However, such power for state banks is not
revolutionary. By enacting parity statutes, at least thirty-five states
have recognized a need to ensure that state bank powers are at least
equal to national bank powers.'
These parity laws, also called "wild card statutes," generally
allow state banks to engage in activities permissible for national
banks without filing for FDIC approval. 33 The Amendments Act
simply encourages states to use their parity laws to help their
chartered banks' interstate branches compete against both national
bank interstate branches and host state banks. By promoting the use
of parity laws, the Amendments Act moves state banks closer toward
competitive equality with national banks.
Although parity laws could ensure equal competition between
state and national banks as far as activities are concerned, some
banking parity laws are unclear about what "constitutes a permissible
national bank activity"' 34 or whether the parity law preempts a
129. 12 U.S.C.A. § 183la(j)(2).
130. See supra notes 87-89, 99-109 and accompanying text.
131. See 12U.S.C.A. § 1831a(j)(2).
132. See McConnell, Easier Route to Interstate Sought for State Banks, supra note 118,
at 2 ("[F]ew states would see their banking laws trampled if the bill is passed. . . . 35 states
already have parity laws on the books to keep state bank powers equal with national
banks.") (quoting John Bley, Chairman of the Interstate Task Force for the CSBS).
133. See Christian A. Johnson, Wild Card Statutes, Parity, and National Banks-The
Renascence of State Banking Powers, 26 LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 351, 360 (1995); see also supra
note 103; infra notes 144-50 and accompanying text.
134. Johnson, supra note 133, at 371. Most parity statutes, however, expressly refer to
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conflicting state law.135 This problem, however, can be easily
remedied. State legislatures can clarify their banking parity statutes
and state banking regulators can issue regulations or interpretations
of these laws.'36 In light of the expansion of national bank powers'37
and states' desire to attract and retain bank charters, states need to
utilize banking parity statutes in order for state charters to compete
and maintain parity with national charters. Otherwise, state banks
may miss opportunities to expand their operations and to respond to
the financial needs of customers.
Encouraging states through parity statutes to grant state banks
the same activity powers as national banks, however, conflicts with
Congress' objective of preserving a true dual banking system. 38
Congress believed that creating competitive equality between state
and national banks would bolster the state charter as a viable choice
for banks interested in interstate branching.'39 Congress achieved
competitive equality between national and state charters by granting
state interstate branches all the powers of their home charter to the
same extent that those activities are permitted for national banks. 41
This provision of the Amendments Act, however, establishes the
federal laws and regulations relating to permissible national bank
activities as the standard for what state bank interstate branches can
do. As a result, only charters of states that empower their banks to
do at least, if not more, activities permissible for a national bank will
seem attractive. 14' Therefore, to attract and retain bank charters, the
Amendments Act pressures states to authorize activities similar to
those allowed for national banks. This pressure diminishes the role
of state regulators in shaping banking policy, which subverts the
purpose of the dual banking system.
federal law for the scope of permissible national bank activities. See id.
135. See id. Although about half of parity statutes specify that conflicting state laws are
preempted, the remaining parity statutes either limit state bank activities to those that do not
conflict with state law or are unclear about whether they preempt state law. See id.
136. See id. at 373.
137. See id. at 364.
138. See H.R. 1306 Hearing, supra note 86, at 2 (opening statement of Representative
Marge Roukema, Chairwoman of the Subcommittee on Financial Institutions and
Consumer Credit).
139. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
140. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 183 lao)(2) (West Supp. 4 1997).
141. See infra notes 157, 166, 176 and accompanying text.
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2. An insured [s]tate bank that establishes a branch in a host
[s]tate may conduct any activity at such branch that is
permissible under the laws of the home [s]tate of such
bank, to the extent such activity is permissible ... for a
bank chartered by the host state .... 142
In order to create competitive equality between state bank
interstate branches and national bank interstate branches while
allowing host states to determine which activities beyond those
exercisable by national banks are permitted within their borders,
Congress provided that a state bank interstate branch can only engage
in an activity allowed under its charter that is impermissible for a
national bank if host state law also permits the activity.14  This
provision further restricts the permissible activities of state bank
interstate branches beyond the limitations imposed through the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991
(FDICIA).144 Prior to FDICIA, state-chartered banks could engage in
activities 145 that were impermissible for national banks, 46 both as an
agent and principal, 47 if permitted under state law. 4 1 In 1991,
142. 12 U.S.C.A. § 183 la(j)(2).
143. See id.
144. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831a (1994).
145. An "activity" is defined as the "authorized conduct of business by an insured state
bank." 12 C.F.R. § 362.2(a) (1997). Although defining activity broadly potentially
restricts state banking activities, the FDIC, relying on legislative intent, acted to "prevent
undue risk to the deposit insurance funds .... ." FDIC Amends Rules Governing State Bank
Investment and Activities, [1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH)
89,605, at 83,697 (Dec. 8, 1993). The FDIC has established a safe harbor regulation
permitting an insured state bank, even if impermissible for national banks, to: (1) conduct
any activity that the Federal Reserve Board has found to be closely related to banking; (2)
conduct securities activities in a subsidiary; and (3) maintain certain stock holdings through
a majority-owned subsidiary. See 12 C.F.R. § 362.3(b); FDIC-Supervised Banks Notified
of Amendments Affecting Investments and Activities, [1993-1994 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 89,617, at 83,847 (Dec. 10, 1993).
146. An activity is permissible for a national bank if the National Bank Act or other
federal statute explicitly permits the activity, or if the OCC through regulations, an official
circular, a bulletin, any order or written interpretation, or any valid staff interpretation,
determines that the National Bank Act or other statute allows the activity. See 12 C.F.R. §
362.2(b); FDIC Amends Rules Governing State Bank Investment and Activities, supra note
145, at 83,694.
147. Acting as "principal" is defined as acting "other than as agent for a customer,...
other than in a brokerage, custodial, advisory or administrative capacity, or... other than as
trustee." 12 C.F.R. § 362.2(c). Examples of principal activities include real estate
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Congress eroded this advantage of state-chartered banks by enacting
FDICIA, which generally limits state-chartered banks' principal
activities to those allowed for national banks.'49 Under FDICIA, in
order for state banks to engage as a principal in activities not
permissible for national banks, not only must state law permit the
activity, but also state banks must now obtain FDIC approval to
engage in the activity. 5 ' Approximately two hundred state banks
have applied to the FDIC for permission to engage in state-
authorized activities not permitted for national banks under federal
law, and some have received such permission.'
Despite FDICIA's restrictions on principal activities of
FDIC-insured state banks, state banks can still engage in agent
activities without gaining FDIC approval to the extent allowed under
state law, which may be more expansive than those activities allowed
for national banks.'52 For example, a state may authorize its state-
chartered banks to act as travel agents,'53 but a national bank may not
do so.' If both the host and home states permit banks to act as
development, insurance and securities underwriting, and issuing annuities. See FDIC
Amends Rules Governing State Bank Investment and Activities, supra note 145, at 83,698.
Conversely, providing safekeeping services or personal financial planning services is not
considered a principal activity. See id.
148. See Johnson, supra note 133, at 360-61; MACEY & MILLER, supra note 60, at 169.
149. See Johnson, supra note 133, at 360-61.
150. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831a(a)(1) (1994); Johnson, supra note 133, at 360-61. The
FDIC regulates national banks and state banks that elect to have federal deposit insurance.
See 12 U.S.C. § 1814. FDIC approval involves determinations that the state bank meets
certain capital requirements and that the activity does not pose a significant risk to the
deposit insurance fund. See 12 U.S.C. § 183 1a(a)(1)-(2); Johnson, supra note 133, at 360-
61.
151. See Telephone Interview with Linda Camp, Counsel for the FDIC (Jan. 26, 1998).
152. FDICIA only restricts state banks' ability to engage in activities as principal. See
12 U.S.C. § 183la(a). No limitations are put on state bank agent activities. See FDIC-
Supervised Banks Notified of Amendments Affecting Investments and Activities, supra note
145, at 83,847. Still, the FDIC can indirectly regulate agent activities based on safety and
soundness considerations. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(a)(2).
153. States may authorize state banks to "operate insurance agencies, securities
brokerage firms, real estate agencies, travel agencies, financial planning services, and
certain other agencies" without FDIC consent. FDIC-Supervised Banks Notified of
Amendments Affecting Investments and Activities, supra note 145, at 83,847.
154. See Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427 (1st Cir. 1972). Arnold Tours might
be decided differently today given that it was decided before Chevron, which mandates that
courts defer to reasonable interpretations of the OCC where a provision of the National
Bank Act is "silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue," unless such
interpretation is "arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." See Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-44 (1984).
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travel agents, then state bank interstate branches will have a
competitive advantage over national banks. Additionally, proposed
rule 12 C.F.R. Part 362 suggests that FDIC-insured state banks may
have even more powers beyond those of national banks."'5
Although FDICIA permits state banks to enjoy broader
activity powers than national banks in some cases, the Amendments
Act has restricted this ability even further for state bank interstate
branches because now the laws of two states must permit the
activity.1 6 While Congress presumably included this restriction in
the Amendments Act to allow states control over activities conducted
by state bank branches within their borders, this provision further
erodes a historical advantage of state banks over national banks. 15 7
Furthermore, this provision encourages BHCs to consolidate multiple
state banks operating in different states into one bank chartered in the
state that allows the most activities because then the bank would
have a greater chance of being able to engage in those activities in
states where it has interstate branches.
By further diminishing the activities advantage of state
charters, the Amendments Act may in some circumstances
contravene Congress' goal of preserving the benefits of the dual
banking system. Prior to interstate branching, states' broader activity
powers allowed states to serve as small laboratories for
experimentation in new banking activities to address customers
changing needs.' No state bank was at a competitive disadvantage
because either all state banks within the same state could engage in
an activity, or no state bank within that state could engage in the
activity. However, after the Amendments Act, the impact of
innovation on the dual banking system will depend on how states
react to the authorization of new activities in other states.
155. See Activities of Insured State Banks and Insured Savings Associations, 62 Fed.
Reg. 47,969, 48,012 (1997) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 362) (proposed Sept. 12, 1997).
For example, under the proposed regulations, without the FDIC's consent, an insured state
bank that is not a member of the Federal Reserve System may continue its securities
activities in accordance with 12 C.F.R. §337.4 (1997) and avoid compliance with the Glass-
Steagall Act. See id. at 48,015. Under these proposed rules, states may maintain part of
their role as innovators and remain competitive with national banks.
156. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 183 la(j)(2) (West Supp. 4 1997).
157. See supra notes 145-48 and accompanying text.
158. See supra notes 112-14 and accompany text.
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First, if only one state permits a new activity, then that new
activity will be confined within that state. On the one hand, this
scenario maintains state banks' roles as innovators while minimizing
the risk to the deposit insurance fund. Yet, the Amendments Act
creates a strong incentive for other states to permit the new activity
so that their state banks' interstate branches remain competitive.
Under this scenario, states no longer function as small laboratories to
test the risk of new activities to the deposit insurance fund.'59 As the
boundaries of experimentation increase to combat competitive
disadvantages, so does the risk to the deposit insurance fund.
Likewise, coupled with FDICIA, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831a(j)(2)
results in decreased competition between state and federal regulators
because it encourages state bank activity powers to mirror those of
national banks. Even though states may still grant state-chartered
banks broader powers than national banks, state banks still must pass
FDICIA requirements, which implies that Congress is not willing to
leave the safety and soundness of federally insured banks to state
regulators. Combined, FDICIA and this provision of the
Amendments Act reduce some historical advantages of state charters
over federal charters that served to offset traditional advantages
enjoyed by national banks. If this erosion of the state bank activities
advantage and state regulatory power is viewed as significant, state
banks could begin converting to national charters, weakening the
dual banking system that the Amendments Act was supposed to
reinforce.
3. The laws of a host [s]tate ... shall apply to any [state
bank interstate] branch in the host [s]tate ... to the same
extent as such [s]tate laws apply to a [national bank
interstate] branch in the host [s]tate .... To the extent
that host [s]tate law is inapplicable to a [state bank
interstate] branch.., home [s]tate law shall apply to such
branch. 60
159. This concern could be ameliorated if states responded by only permitting interstate
branches of its state banks to engage in the activity, thus confining the activity to the
original authorizing state.
160. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831a j)(1).
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Finally, Congress hoped to accomplish competitive equality
between state and national bank interstate branches by granting host
states the same control over state bank interstate branches as national
bank interstate branches. As with national banks, the host state, for
example, will control the state bank interstate branch's ability to
branch intrastate. 6' Thus, host states still maintain a degree of
control over all banks operating within their borders without
hampering state bank interstate branches' ability to compete with
national bank interstate branches.
Although principles of federal preemption dictate that states
can exercise only limited control over national banks, historically
states have had complete control over state banks and state bank
interstate branches.162 The Amendments Act usurps this control by
providing that host state laws, other than those relating to banking
activities, apply to state bank interstate branches only to the extent
that such laws apply to national bank interstate branches.
Consequently, now Congress and the OCC dictate the extent to
which host state laws will control state bank interstate branches
because Congress can pass laws that explicitly preempt state law, and
the OCC has the power to determine whether a federal law implicitly
preempts state law or whether a state law impermissibly
discriminates against national banks.163  For example, if the OCC
interprets federal law as preempting a New Jersey consumer
protection law, then a national bank may ignore the law.
Consequently, under the Amendments Act, New York-chartered
Chase Manhattan, our country's largest bank in regard to assets and
one of the leading supporters of the Amendments Act, might be able
161. See id.
162. See § 1831a(j)(1)-(2) (1994), amended by Riegle-Neal Amendments Act, Pub. L.
No. 105-24, § 2, 111 Stat. 238 (1997).
163. Host state laws do not apply to state bank interstate branches "when [flederal law
preempts the application of such [s]tate laws to a national bank; or when the [OCC]
determines that the application of such [s]tate laws would have a discriminatory effect on
the branch in comparison ... to branches of a bank chartered by the host [s]tate." 12
U.S.C. § 36(f)(1)(A)(i)-(ii) (1994). The Amendments Act requires the OCC to report past
preemption from 1992 to present and any future actions resulting in the inapplicability of
state laws to national banks. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 36(f)(1)(C) (West Supp. 4 1997).
Examples of state laws preempted through interpretations of the OCC include restrictions
on Saturday operations, insurance licensing provisions, restrictions on alternative mortgage
transactions, and registration and examination of national banks acting as municipal finance
consultants. See OCC Interpretive Letter 572, supra note 125, at 71,473.
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to operate in New Jersey "without complying with state consumer
protection laws it believes are oppressive."'"
To achieve competitive equality, the Amendments Act
reallocated some of host states' power to govern state bank interstate
branches to Congress and the OCC. 65 Yet, host state-chartered
banks will be at a disadvantage with both national and state bank
interstate branches in the host state when host state laws which are
more restrictive than federal or home state laws are preempted.
Therefore, a host state bank still may have an incentive to convert to
a national charter in order to avoid strict state laws and to better
compete with both national and state bank interstate branches. This
incentive, however, directly conflicts with the Amendment Act's
purpose of preventing state banks from converting to national
charters.'66 The Amendments Act may have lessened the fear that
state banks would convert to national charters for interstate
branching, but an incentive still exists. Nonetheless, the
Amendments Act mitigates the incentive to convert to a national
bank because a state bank could convert its charter to another state
with less restrictive banking laws.
Contrary to the CSBS's assertion that the Amendments Act
will curtail federal preemption, 12 U.S.C.A. § 183la(j)(1) magnifies
the effect of federal preemption of state law by allowing state bank
interstate branches, in addition to national bank interstate branches,
to ignore host state law.'67 Adding to this problem, the OCC has
increasingly interpreted federal law as preempting state law.'68 In
light of the OCC's proclivity toward federal preemption, state
legislators fear that the OCC will also preempt state consumer laws
164. Arthur Postal, Interstate Legislation Slowed in Senate, INT'L BANKING REGULATOR,
May 2, 1997, available in 1997 WL 7965806.
165. See Stouffer, supra note 27 ("What good is a dual banking system if the states lose
their power?") (quoting Michelle Meier, Consumer Union Counsel for Government
Affairs).
166. See supra notes 88-89, 101-11, 117-18 and accompanying text.
167. See H.R. 1306 Hearing, supra note 86, at 43 (testimony of Michelle Meier,
Consumer Union Counsel for Government Affairs); supra note 117 and accompanying text.
168. See OCC Interpretive Letter 572, supra note 125, at 71,475 (listing examples of
state law preemption by the OCC). For instance, in 1992, the OCC preempted a New Jersey
lifeline banking law. See id. at 71,476 (reasoning that a New Jersey law providing that
banks must offer customers the minimum deposit account services for a statutory set fee
was preempted by the explicit language in 12 U.S.C § 24 (Seventh) authorizing national
banks to "receive deposits").
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prohibiting ATM surcharges16 9 or prepayment penalties on residential
mortgages. 7 In response to this concern, Congress installed a safety
valve in the Amendments Act that calls for an annual review of the
OCC's preemption of state law.17 1 However, this places upon
Congress the burden of deciding whether to condone the OCC's
increasing preemption and upon states the uncertainty of
congressional response.
Despite the fact that Congress will review the OCC's actions,
by diminishing states' control over state banking practices, the
Amendments Act undermines the ability of states to protect their
own citizens.1 72  For example, when a state's law is preempted,
customers of an interstate branch must rely on the bank's home state
law or federal law, depending on whether the branch was established
by a state or national bank, for protection against such things as
unfair and deceptive trade practices.'73 Consumer protection
advocates assert that if the OCC continues its aggressive preemption
of state laws, states will be unable to protect consumers.174 The home
state, for example, may have empowered its chartered banks to
&ngage in an activity "without putting in place the safeguards needed
to deter against unfair sales practices and unfair competition with
non-bank agencies.' 75 Because some states have stricter regulatory
schemes in some areas than other states, the Amendments Act will
hopefully foster interstate cooperation in formulating strong state
laws to protect bank customers, regardless of which state law
controls.
The Amendments Act, however, also ignites competition
among states to adopt liberal banking laws in order to attract bank
charters.176 If the goal of a state is to attract bank charters, then
consumer protection laws will probably be lax rather than strict.
169. See Stouffer, supra note 27.
170. See id. "A number of states prohibit mortgage lenders from charging borrowers
when they unavoidably prepay their mortgage balance when they sell their home." Id.
171. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 36(f)(1)(C) (West Supp. 4 1997).
172. See Financial Services Competitiveness Act Hearings, supra note 95, at 340
(testimony of Mary Griffin, Consumer Union's Insurance Counsel).
173. See id.
174. See H.. 1306 Hearing, supra note 86, at 78-79 (prepared statement of Michelle
Meier, Consumer Union Counsel for Government Affairs).
175. Id. at 78.
176. See id. at 79.
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Consequently, consumer protection groups worry that multi-million
dollar banks, instead of individual citizens or consumer lobbying
groups, will have greater influence with state legislatures.'
Therefore, states face the challenge of balancing their citizens'
interests in consumer protection with the desire to attract banks to
their state charters.
B. Interstate Branching and Credit Card Interest Rates
One of the questions raised by the breakdown of geographic
banking barriers that Riegle-Neal and the Amendments Act fails to
fully answer is which state's law controls the credit card interest rate
which may be charged by interstate branches. Generally, banks
"may ... charge interest at the rate allowed by the laws of the [s]tate
... where the bank is located."'178 Prior to interstate branching, this
statutory language had been interpreted to allow national banks to
export interest rates from their home state to customers located in
other states even if the interest charged would be usurious under the
laws of the state in which the customers reside.1
79
As the OCC has noted, the legislative history of Riegle-Neal
indicates that "in the context of nationwide interstate branching, it is
the office of the bank or branch making the loan that determines
which [s]tate law applies."'' ° Furthermore, where the loan is "made"
177. See id.
178. 12 U.S.C. § 85 (1994).
179. See Marquette Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978). In
Marquette, the Court held that a national bank with its main office in Nebraska, which was
soliciting credit card customers in Minnesota, could charge Minnesota customers
Nebraska's interest rates. See id. Relying on Marquette, in Christiansen v. Beneficial
National Bank, 972 F. Supp. 681 (S.D. Ga. 1997), which involved a national bank's power
to export its home interest rates on tax refund anticipation loans, the OCC filed an amicus
brief stating that an interstate branch of a national bank could apply its home state interest
rate. See Home State Interest Rates Upheld, REG. COMPLIANCE WATCH, July 28, 1997,
available in LEXIS, CURNWS Library, ABBB File. Thus, national banks need not
necessarily "become familiar with and comply with a hodgepodge of state usury laws
throughout the United States." Id. Issues involving interest rates in the interstate branching
context are not raised if a bank maintains a separate bank subsidiary for credit card
operations.
180. Letter from Julie L. Williams, Chief Counsel, Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, to Jeremy T. Rosenblum, Partner, Ballard Spahr Andrews & Ingersoll 14 (Feb.
17, 1998) (visited Mar. 3, 1998) <http://www.occ.treas.gov> [hereinafter OCC Letter]
(emphasis added in Letter) (quoting 140 CONG. REC. S12,789 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1994)
(statement of Sen. Roth (R-DE)).
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depends on where the three "non-ministerial" loan functions-
approval of the loan, disbursement of the proceeds, and extension of
credit-are performed.'
Recently, the OCC concluded that where a "clear nexus"
exists between the bank's home state and the loans, i"2 a bank
principally conducting its credit card business from its home state
"may continue to charge the interest rate permitted by its [home]
state regardless of the state in which its customers are located, even
though the bank now has a branch in the customer's state."'83 Thus,
the Marquette principle continues in the interstate branching context.
In addition, the OCC has also ruled that if a bank engages in
credit card services at a branch outside the bank's home state, "the
[b]ank may charge interest rates permitted by the law of the ... state
[in which the branch is located] no matter where [the customers] may
reside," as long as there is "a clear nexus between the branch and the
loan."'8 4 In fact, the OCC has indicated that if all of the "non-
ministerial" functions of making a loan occur in a single host state, a
181. See OCC Letter, supra note 180, at 8 (citing 140 CONG. REc. S12,789 (daily ed.
Sept. 13, 1994) (statement of Senator Roth).
182. See OCC Interpretive Letter 776, A National Bank May Export Interest Rates
Permitted by the Law of the State in which Its Main Office Is Located to Customers in
Another State where the Bank Has a Branch, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 81-203, at 90,206-07 (Mar. 18, 1997) (where the bank "conducts virtually all of its
credit card operations in and from its [home] state"). The OCC has indicated that
performing one of the three non-ministerial loan functions in the home state might be a
sufficient nexus for the bank to charge that state's interest rate. Cf OCC Letter, supra note
180, at 14.
183. Interstate Banking Rules, ABA BANK COMPLIANCE Sept. 1997, available in LEXIS,
BANKNG Library, CURNWS File (citing OCC Interpretive Letter 776, A National Bank
May Export Interest Rates Permitted by the Law of the State in which Its Main Office Is
Located to Customers in Another State where the Bank Has a Branch, [1997 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 81-203, at 90,203 (Mar. 18, 1997)).
184. OCC Interpretive Letter 782, Credit Card Interest Charged at Rate Allowed by
State Where Bank Branch was Located, [1997 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking L. Rep.
(CCH) 81-209, at 90,226 (May 21, 1997) (where the bank "conducts virtually all of its
credit card operations in and from [blank facilities [in the branch state]"). Thus, the OCC
has established that, for purposes of 12 U.S.C. § 85, a bank is also "located" in a state
where it operates a branch and may be able to charge that state's interest rate in certain
circumstances. See id.; OCC Interpretive Letter 686, A National Bank's Branches Outside
of the Home State of Its Main Office Were Able to Charge Interest at the Rate Allowed for
the "Most Favored Lender" in the Branches' State, [1995-96 Transfer Binder] Fed. Banking
L. Rep. (CCH) 81-001, at 90,203-04 (Sept. 11, 1995). The OCC has indicated that
performing one or two of the three non-ministerial loan functions in a host state might be a
sufficient nexus for the bank to charge that state's interest rate. Cf OCC Letter, supra note
180, at 14.
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national bank may not charge the interest rate permitted under the
laws of its home state, rather must charge the interest rate of that host
state. "'85 However, the OCC has also stated that where the non-
ministerial loan functions are performed in multiple host states, a
national bank may always charge its home state interest rates.186
Despite these recent interpretations by the OCC, at least one
question remains. If a significant portion of a bank's credit card
operations take place in more than one host state, the bank may
charge a host state's interest rate only if the host state satisfies the
"clear nexus" test.'87 Although the OCC has indicated that the
performance of "one or two" non-ministerial functions may
constitute a sufficient nexus, exactly how little operations can occur
in the host state remains to be seen.'88
V. CONCLUSION
By enacting the Amendments Act, Congress attempted to
maintain state charters as a viable option for state banks interested in
interstate branching and to ensure that the benefits of the dual
banking system continue in the interstate environment." 9 To a large
extent, Congress achieved its goal of competitive equality between
state and national chartered banks and their respective interstate
branches. Congress did not, however, achieve its objective of
retaining the benefits of the dual banking system because this
objective conflicts with Congress' desire to have competitive
equality between state and national banks."9 The Amendments Act
185. See OCC Letter, supra note 180, at 14.
186. See id. at 9.
187. See id. at 14.
188. Cf id. There are several OCC interpretive letters dealing with the "clear nexus"
issue, but none are particularly instructive on when a nexus becomes "clear." See, e.g.,
OCC Interpretive Letter 782, supra note 184; OCC Interpretive Letter 776, supra note 182;
OCC Interpretive Letter 707, The Interstate Merger of Two Banks Would Not Affect the
Permissible Rates that May Be Imposed for Consumer Loans, [1995-96 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) 81-022, at 90,269-71 (Jan. 31, 1996); OCC Interpretive
Letter 686, supra note 184.
189. See supra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
190. Professors Butler and Macey contend that: (1) the federal government's ability to
preempt state regulations; (2) the FDIC's ability to establish uniformity between national
and state banks; and (3) banking parity statutes inhibit the dual banking system. See Henry
N. Butler & Jonathan R. Macey, The Myth of Competition in the Dual Banking System, 73
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demonstrates that Congress cannot accomplish its goals of
competitive equality, preserving state control over state banking
practices, and maintaining state banks' role as innovators. Although
a valiant effort, the Amendments Act exhibits that attempting to
achieve all of these conflicting goals will only result in an endless
tug of war.
The Amendments Act, as did FDICIA and state banking
parity laws, further erodes the distinction between state and national
banks and illustrates the trend of federal law setting the parameters
for what state banks can do. Moreover, the Amendments Act shows
that as geographic limitations on banking have dissipated under
Riegle-Neal, the control that states can exert over banking practices
within their borders has also diminished. As these trends continue, it
begs the question of whether the need for a dual banking system still
exists, given the reduced power and role of states.
Altogether, the Amendments Act illustrates that the
traditional ability of states to control banking operations within their
borders has become less important. Likewise, the location or
headquarters of a bank has also become less relevant for bank
customers who now use ATMs, direct deposit, internet banking, and
who are most likely charged out-of-state credit card interest rates.
Most importantly, the Amendments Act clarifies the applicability of
home and host state laws to state-chartered banks operating across
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